David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74 (2007)
Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been `finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt devise - e.g. the addiction - is intrinsic to the agent.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Smith (2004). Ethics and the a Priori: Selected Essays on Moral Psychology and Meta-Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Smith (2003). Rational Capacities. In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Varities of Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. 17-38.
Michael A. Smith (1997). A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility. In Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford University Press. 293-317.
Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.) (2003/2007). Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
Susan Wolf (1990). Freedom Within Reason. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Neil Levy & Michael McKenna (2009). Recent Work on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.
Toby Handfield (2008). Unfinkable Dispositions. Synthese 160 (2):297 - 308.
Sungho Choi (2012). Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction. Noûs 46 (2):289-325.
Randolph Clarke (2010). Opposing Powers. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.
Randolph Clarke (2008). Intrinsic Finks. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):512–518.
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