Finking Frankfurt

Philosophical Studies 135 (3):363--74 (2007)
Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been `finked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt devise - e.g. the addiction - is intrinsic to the agent.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Religion   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/40208915
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.

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Citations of this work BETA
Randolph Clarke (2008). Intrinsic Finks. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):512–518.
Randolph Clarke (2010). Opposing Powers. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):153 - 160.

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