David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Hume Studies 36 (2):193-213 (2012)
There is considerable evidence that Hume thinks the moral sentiments (approval and disapproval) move us to action, at least in some circumstances. For one thing, he relies on the premise that moral evaluations move us to action to argue that moral evaluations are not derived from reason alone, in his most famous anti-rationalist argument. Presumably, this capacity of moral evaluations can be explained by the fact that (as Hume sees it) such evaluations are, or are the product of, moral sentiments. But this raises three interconnected interpretive questions. First, on Hume's account, much virtuous behavior is traceable to motives other than the sentiments of approval and disapproval; so when and how do the moral ..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2008). Reason, Morality, and Hume's "Active Principles&Quot;: Comments on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Hume Studies 34 (2):267-276.
Rachel Cohon (1997). The Common Point of View in Hume's Ethics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):827-850.
Noriaki Iwasa (2013). On Three Defenses of Sentimentalism. Prolegomena 12 (1):61-82.
J. Baird Callicott (1992). Can a Theory of Moral Sentiments Support a Genuinely Normative Environmental Ethic? Inquiry 35 (2):183 – 198.
Noriaki Iwasa (2011). Sentimentalism and the Is-Ought Problem. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (33):323-352.
Nancy Schauber (2009). Complexities of Character. Hume Studies 35 (1/2):29-55.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2010). From 'Convention' to 'Ethical Life': Hume's Theory of Justice in Post-Kantian Perspective. Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (1):105-132.
Jacqueline Taylor (2002). Hume on the Standard of Virtue. Journal of Ethics 6 (1):43-62.
Jonas Olson (2011). Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics. Hume Studies 37 (1):19-42.
Reed Winegar (2011). Good Sense, Art, and Morality in Hume's ''Of the Standard of Taste''. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 9 (1):17-35.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1999). Hume on the Generation of Motives: Why Beliefs Alone Never Motivate. Hume Studies 25 (1-2):101-122.
John Bricke (1996). Mind and Morality: An Examination of Hume's Moral Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Gerald J. Postema (2013). The Cautious, Jealous Virtue: Hume on Justice by Annette C. Baier. Hume Studies 37 (2):280-284.
Paul Russell (1995). Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
Ernest Partridge (1996). Ecological Morality and Nonmoral Sentiments. Environmental Ethics 18 (2):149-163.
Added to index2012-01-27
Total downloads56 ( #27,684 of 1,101,079 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #16,971 of 1,101,079 )
How can I increase my downloads?