Hume on representation, reason and motivation
| Abstract | A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent. (T 415). | |||||||||
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Aaron Z. Zimmerman (2007). Hume's Reasons. Hume Studies 33 (2):211-256.
Derek Parfit (1997). Reasons and Motivation. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):99–130.
Ralph Wedgwood (1995). Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation. European Journal of Philosophy 3 (3):273-288.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (1999). Hume on the Generation of Motives: Why Beliefs Alone Never Motivate. Hume Studies 25 (1-2):101-122.
Paul Russell (2006). Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism. In Heiner F. Klemme Dieter Schönecker & Manfred Kuehn (eds.), “Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism”, in Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kuehn, Dieter Schönecker, eds., Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Kant-Forschungen. Felix Meiner Verlag.
David Owen (1999). Hume's Reason. Oxford University Press.
Clarence Sholé Johnson (1992). Yet Another Look at Cognitive Reason and Moral Action in Hume's Ethical System. Journal of Philosophical Research 17:225-238.
Elizabeth S. Radcliffe (2010). Reason, Morality, and Hume's "Active Principles": Comments on Rachel Cohon's Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication. Hume Studies 34 (2):267-276.
Evan Simpson (1979). Reason Over Passion: The Social Basis of Evaluation and Appraisal. Wilfrid Laurier University Press.
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