Knowledge, speaker and subject
Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):199–212 (2005)
| Abstract | I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox | |||||||||
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