Molinists (still) cannot endorse the consequence argument

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):231-246 (2015)
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Abstract

Perszyk has argued that Molinists cannot consistently endorse the consequence argument because of a structurally similar argument for the incompatibility of true Molinist counterfactuals of freedom and the ability to do otherwise. Wierenga has argued that on the proper understanding of CCFs, there is a relevant difference between the consequence argument and the anti-Molinist argument. I argue that, even on Wierenga’s understanding of CCFs, there is in fact no relevant difference between the two arguments. Moreover, I strengthen Perszyk’s challenge by highlighting further relevant similarities between CCFs and facts about the laws.

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Yishai Cohen
University of Southern Maine

Citations of this work

If Molinism is true, what can you do?Andrew Law - forthcoming - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion:1-16.
Counterfactuals of Freedom and the Luck Objection to Libertarianism.Robert J. Hartman - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42 (1):301-312.
Probabilism: An Open Future Solution to the Actualism/Possibilism Debate.Yishai Cohen & Travis Timmerman - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-22.
Are We Free to Break the Laws of Providence?Kenneth L. Pearce - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):158-180.

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Philosophy of Science 42 (3):341-344.

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