More Than Bare Existence: An Implicature of Existential Bare Plurals

Journal of Semantics 22 (4):389-400 (2005)
Abstract
Existential bare plurals (e.g. dogs) have the same semantics as explicit existentials (e.g. a dog or some dogs) but different pragmatics. In addition to entailing the existence of a set of individuals, existential bare plurals implicate that this set is suitable for some purpose. The suitability implicature is a form of what has been variously called informativeness-based or R-based implicature. Condoravdi (1992, 1994) and others have claimed that bare plurals have a third reading (in addition to the generic and the existential), sometimes called quasi-universal. However, the suitability implicature is sufficient to account for the quasi-universal interpretation, without the need to stipulate a distinct reading of bare plurals
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    Friederike Moltmann (2013). The Semantics of Existence. Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (1):31-63.
    Jennifer Mckltrick (2003). The Bare Metaphysical Possibility of Bare Dispositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):349–369.
    P. D. Magnus (2004). The Price of Insisting That Quantum Mechanics is Complete. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):257-267.
    Andrew M. Bailey (2012). No Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
    Richard Brian Davis (2003). 'Partially Clad' Bare Particulars Exposed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):534 – 548.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2010-09-02

    Total downloads

    5 ( #178,728 of 1,088,424 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    0

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.