Meta-Externalism vs Meta-Internalism in the Study of Reference

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):475-500 (2013)
Abstract
We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta- internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation.
Keywords reference  intuition  internalism  externalism  meta-internalism  meta-externalism  philosophical methodology  experimental philosophy
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Louis deRosset (2010). Reference and Response. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99999 (1):1-18.

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Citations of this work BETA
James Andow (2014). Intuitions, Disagreement and Referential Pluralism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):223-239.
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