Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 17 (4):471-495 (2004)
|Abstract||In Clark (2000), Austen Clark argues convincingly that a widespread view of perception as a complicated kind of feature-extraction is incomplete. He argues that perception has another crucial representational ingredient: it must also involve the representation of "sensory individuals" that exemplify sensorily extracted features. Moreover, he contends, the best way of understanding sensory individuals takes them to be places in space surrounding the perceiver. In this paper, I'll agree with Clark's case for sensory individuals (|
|Keywords||Epistemology Object Perception Place Clark, A|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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