Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1):1-13 (1971)
|Abstract||The central argument in the Euthyphro is the one Socrates advances against the definition of piety as "what all the gods love." The argument turns on establishing that a loved thing (philoumenon) is 1) a loved thing because it is loved (phileitai), not 2) loved because it is a loved thing. I suggest that this claim can be understood and found acceptable if we take "because" to be used equivocally in it. Despite the equivocation, Socrates' argument is valid, showing that Euthyphro cannot offer this definition consistently with his view that the gods have as a reason for loving pious things that they are pious things|
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