Subjectivism, physicalism or none of the above? Comments on Ross's The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):94-104 (2001)
In “The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism,” Peter Ross argues against what he calls subjectivism — the view that “colors are not describable in physical terms, ... [but are] mental processes or events of visual states” (2),1 and in favor of physicalism — a view according to which colors are “physical properties of physical objects, such as reﬂectance properties” (10). He rejects an argument that has been oﬀered in support of subjectivism, and argues that, since no form of subjectivism is able to account for our perception of color, we are better oﬀ adopting physicalism.
|Keywords||*Color Perception *Philosophies *Subjectivity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
Christopher Peacocke (1984). Colour Concepts and Colour Experience. Synthese 58 (March):365-82.
Frank Jackson (1996). The Primary Quality View of Color. Philosophical Perspectives 10:199-219.
Brian McLaughlin (2003). The Place of Color in Nature. In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press 475--502.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Joseph Levine (2006). Color and Color Experience: Colors as Ways of Appearing. Dialectica 60 (3):269-282.
Wayne Wright (2003). A Dilemma for Jackson and Pargetter's Account of Color. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):125-42.
P. Ross (2000). The Relativity of Color. Synthese 123 (1):105-130.
Antti Revonsuo (2001). Putting Color Back Where It Belongs. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):78-84.
Zoltán Jakab (2001). Commentary on P. W. Ross: The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):133-139.
Nigel J. T. Thomas (2001). Color Realism: Toward a Solution to the "Hard Problem". Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):140-145.
David M. Rosenthal (2001). Color, Mental Location, and the Visual Field. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):85-93.
Ian Gold (2001). Spatial Location in Color Vision. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):59-62.
Peter W. Ross (2012). Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism. American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
Peter W. Ross (2001). The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads42 ( #94,826 of 1,790,304 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #83,770 of 1,790,304 )
How can I increase my downloads?