Subjectivism, physicalism or none of the above? Comments on Ross's The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism

Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):94-104 (2001)
In “The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism,” Peter Ross argues against what he calls subjectivism — the view that “colors are not describable in physical terms, ... [but are] mental processes or events of visual states” (2),1 and in favor of physicalism — a view according to which colors are “physical properties of physical objects, such as reflectance properties” (10). He rejects an argument that has been offered in support of subjectivism, and argues that, since no form of subjectivism is able to account for our perception of color, we are better off adopting physicalism.
Keywords *Color Perception  *Philosophies  *Subjectivity
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DOI 10.1006/ccog.2000.0479
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References found in this work BETA
Mark Johnston (1992). How to Speak of the Colors. Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Joseph Levine (1983). Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (October):354-61.
Frank Jackson (1996). The Primary Quality View of Color. Philosophical Perspectives 10:199-219.
Brian McLaughlin (2003). The Place of Color in Nature. In Rainer Mausfeld & Dieter Heyer (eds.), Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World. Oxford University Press 475--502.

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