There is no special problem about scientific representation

Theoria 55 (1):67-85 (2006)
We propose that scientific representation is a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible theories of the latter are directly applicable to the scien- tific special case. Construing scientific representation in this way makes the so-called “problem of scientific representation” look much less inter- esting than it has seemed to many, and suggests that some of the (hotly contested) debates in the literature are concerned with non-issues.
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Stephen M. Downes (2011). Scientific Models. Philosophy Compass 6 (11):757-764.

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