Ideal agency and the possibility of error
Ethics 118 (2):315-323 (2008)
| Abstract | Lavin’s conclusion—that strong imperativalism and constitutivism are incompatible—spells trouble for contemporary Kantians who, like Korsgaard, hope to combine these two doctrines. I aim to offer them some solace by showing that Lavin’s criticism rests on a mistaken conception of ideal rational agency. | |||||||||
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