Artificial intelligence and personal identity
Synthese 88 (September):399-417 (1991)
| Abstract | Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person, modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that artificial minds are impossible: minds and persons are not the same as the machines, biological or electronic, that realize them. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Artificial Intelligence Metaphysics Mind Personal Identity Searle, J | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesTracy B. Henley (1990). Natural Problems and Artificial Intelligence. Behavior and Philosophy 18 (2):43-55.
John R. Searle (2002). Twenty-One Years in the Chinese Room. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Stevan Harnad (2003). Minds, Machines, and Searle 2: What's Right and Wrong About the Chinese Room Argument. In John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Kevin Warwick (2002). Alien Encounters. In Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Georges Rey (2003). Searle's Misunderstandings of Functionalism and Strong AI. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
Dale Jacquette (1990). Fear and Loathing (and Other Intentional States) in Searle's Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.
Stevan Harnad (1989). Minds, Machines and Searle. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 1 (4):5-25.
John Mark Bishop (2003). Dancing with Pixies: Strong Artificial Intelligence and Panpsychism. In John M. Preston & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
John M. Preston & John Mark Bishop (eds.) (2002). Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. Oxford University Press.
David Marr (1977). Artificial Intelligence: A Personal View. Artificial Intelligence 9 (September):37-48.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads125 ( #3,984 of 556,837 )Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #4,815 of 556,837 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
