David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 15 (1):261-287 (2010)
Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. Firstly, the abnormalities of cognition which initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Secondly, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider eight) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairments is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur. A second cognitive impairment, one which impairs the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Thirdly (and this is the main thrust of our chapter) we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief.
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Citations of this work BETA
Philip Gerrans (2013). Delusional Attitudes and Default Thinking. Mind and Language 28 (1):83-102.
Ryan Mckay (2012). Delusional Inference. Mind and Language 27 (3):330-355.
Max Coltheart (2013). On the Distinction Between Monothematic and Polythematic Delusions. Mind and Language 28 (1):103-112.
Jennifer Radden (2013). Delusions Redux. Mind and Language 28 (1):125-139.
Philip Gerrans (2012). Dream Experience and a Revisionist Account of Delusions of Misidentification. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):217-227.
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