Online research in philosophy

CHAPTER I THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF ALBERT EINSTEIN Section A . The Inductive Beginnings of Scientific Investigation The famous use by Einstein of the elliptical ...

This paper combines the following elements: (1) A review and evaluation of the principal places in Einstein's philosophical statements which suggest that he does (or does not) advocate a positivistic epistemology of science. (2) A review and evaluation of the principal arguments suggesting that Einstein's version of the special theory of relativity leads (or does not lead) to a positivistic epistemology of science. It is argued that (1) a sharp distinction between scientific concepts and their relations to sensory evidence is required by Einstein's statements, and by the special theory itself; (2) that distinction, as employed in this context, entails a nonpositivistic epistemology; and (3) that distinction provides the key to an understanding of Einstein's apparently positivistic statements.

High-level study discusses Newtonian principles and 19th-century views on electrodynamics and the aether, covers Einstein’s electrodynamics of moving bodies, Minkowski geometry and other topics. A rich exposition of the elements of the Special and General Theory of Relativity.

This paper is intended as an extension to some of the recent discussion in the philosophical literature on the nature of experimental evidence. In particular I examine the role of empirical evidence attained through the use of deductions from phenomena. This approach to theory construction has been widely used throughout the history of science both by Newton and Einstein as well as Clerk Maxwell. I discuss a particular formulation of maxwell's electrodynamics, one he claims was deduced from experimental facts. However, the deduction is problematic in that it is not immediately clear that one of the crucial parameters of the theory, the displacement current, can be given an empirical foundation. In outlining Maxwell's argument and his attempts to arrive on an empirically based account of the electromagnetic field equations I draw attention to the philosophical implications of the constraints on theory that arise in this particular case of deduction from phenomena.

Classical physics is a theory of nature that originated with the work of Isaac Newton in the seventeenth century and was advanced by the contributions of James Clerk Maxwell and Albert Einstein. Newton based his theory on the work of Johannes Kepler, who found that the planets appeared to move in accordance with a simple mathematical law, and in ways wholly determined by their spatial relationships to other objects. Those motions were apparently independent of our human observations of them.

In the Preface to the Principia (1687) Newton famously states that “geometry is founded on mechanical practice”. Several commentators have taken this and similar remarks as an indication that Newton was firmly situated in the constructivist tradition of geometry that was prevalent in the seventeenth century. By drawing on a selection of Newton’s unpublished texts, I hope to show the faults of such an interpretation. In these texts, Newton not only rejects the constructivism that took its birth in Descartes’ Géométrie (1637); he also presents the science of geometry as being more powerful than his Principia remarks may lead us to believe.

In the preface to the Principia (1687) Newton famously states that “geometry is founded on mechanical practice.” Several commentators have taken this and similar remarks as an indication that Newton was firmly situated in the constructivist tradition of geometry that was prevalent in the seventeenth century. By drawing on a selection of Newton's unpublished texts, I hope to show the faults of such an interpretation. In these texts, Newton not only rejects the constructivism that took its birth in Descartes's Géométrie (1637); he also presents the science of geometry as being more powerful than his Principia remarks may lead us to believe.

Abstract Einstein intended the general theory of relativity to be a generalization of the relativity of motion and, therefore, a radical departure from previous spacetime theories. It has since become clear, however, that this intention was not fulfilled. I try to explain Einstein's misunderstanding on this point as a misunderstanding of the role that spacetime plays in physics. According to Einstein, earlier spacetime theories introduced spacetime as the unobservable cause of observable relative motions and, in particular, as the cause of inertial effects of ?absolute? motion. I use a comparative analysis of Einstein and Newton to show that spacetime is not introduced as an explanation of observable effects, but rather is defined through those effects in arguments like Newton's ?water bucket? argument and Einstein's argument for special relativity. I then argue that to claim that a spacetime theory is true, or to claim that a spacetime structure is ?real?, is not to claim that a theoretical object explains the observable. Rather, it is to claim that the fundamental definitions that link spacetime structure to physical phenomena are empirically sound, i.e. that they can be successfully applied empirically. This leads to a new and clearer view of the empirical content of spacetime theories and of the meaning of ?realism? about spacetime.

In part I, we presented an algebraic-style of semantics, which we called “content semantics,” for quantified relevant logics based on the weak systemBBQ. We showed soundness and completeness with respect to theunreduced semantics ofBBQ. In part II, we proceed to show soundness and completeness for extensions ofBBQ with respect to this type of semantics. We introducereduced semantics which requires additional postulates for primeness and saturation. We then conclude by showing soundness and completeness forBB d Q and its extentions with respect to this reduced semantics.