David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 31 (December):495-518 (1988)
Phenomenologists such as Merleau?Ponty have argued that the ordinary teleological relation between an embodied agent and the world is neither ?subjective? nor ?cognitive?, i.e. that it is not normally mediated by a chain of explicit cognition occurring within a distinct mental subject. Yet, while this seems true from a first?person, phenomenological perspective, I argue that teleological forms of explanation require the ascription of Intentional states. Intentional states, however, are usually regarded as subjective, cognitive states. In order to reconcile the phenomenology with the logic of teleology, I introduce the notion of ?body?intentionality?. I maintain that we can use a modified version of Jonathan Bennett's concept of a teleological law to specify third?person empirical criteria for a pre?cognitive, pre?subjective kind of Intentionality. I also argue that this notion of body?intentionality provides us with at least a partial solution to the mind?body problem that avoids the inadequacies of the computational theory of mind
|Keywords||Cognitive Intentionality Social Philosophy Subjective Bennett, J Merleau-ponty|
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References found in this work BETA
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
John Haugeland (ed.) (1981). Mind Design. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Thomas Raab & Robert Frodeman (2002). What is It Like to Be a Geologist? A Phenomenology of Geology and its Epistemological Implications. Philosophy and Geography 5 (1):69 – 81.
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