Report a bug on this page | Sign in | Create an account
 
PhilPapers home blank

Online research in philosophy


Entries: 207,550  New this week: 120
blank
 General search   Category finder 
advanced search | help | use + and * as usual.
Type words to match in category names
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?

Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.

  • Max Coltheart (2005). Conscious Experience and Delusional Belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.
    Psychopathology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    Schizophrenia in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: muse.jhu.edu   | Scholar
    36 downloads  |  Added to index:2009-01-27  |  Mark as duplicate |  Delete from index


Discussion of Max Coltheart, Conscious experience and delusional belief
Other forums | There are no threads in this forum | Start a new thread First post Latest post Total
Nothing in this forum yet.


Similar books and articles
  • 94.3Max Coltheart, Peter Menzies & John Sutton, Abductive Inference and Delusional Belief.
    Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. Firstly, the abnormalities of cognition which initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term “experience” to consciousness we refer to “abnormal data” rather than “abnormal experience”. Secondly, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider eight) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive (...) data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairments is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur. A second cognitive impairment, one which impairs the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Thirdly (and this is the main thrust of our chapter) we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief. (shrink)
    No categories
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 86.6Philip Gerrans (2001). Delusions as Performance Failures. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 6 (3).
    Delusions are explanations of anomalous experiences. A theory of delusion requires an explanation of both the anomalous experience _and _the apparently irrational explanation generated by the delusional subject. Hence, we require a model of rational belief formation against which the belief formation of delusional subjects can be evaluated. _Method. _I first describe such a model, distinguishing procedural from pragmatic rationality. Procedural rationality is the use of rules or procedures, deductive or inductive, that produce an inferentially coherent set of propositions. Pragmatic (...) rationality is the use of procedural rationality _in context_. I then apply the distinction to the explanation of the Capgras and the Cotard delusions. I then argue that delusions are failures of pragmatic rationality. I examine the nature of these failures employing the distinction between performance and competence familiar from Chomskian linguistics. _Results. _This approach to the irrationality of delusions reconciles accounts in which the explanation of the anomalous experience exhausts the explanation of delusion, accounts that appeal to further deficits within the reasoning processes of delusional subjects, and accounts that argue that delusions are not beliefs at all. (Respectively, one-stage, two-stage, and expressive accounts.) _Conclusion. _In paradigm cases that concern cognitive neuropsychiatry the irrationality of delusional subjects should be thought of as a performance deficit in pragmatic rationality. (shrink)
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: adelaide.edu.au arts.adelaide.edu.au ncbi.nlm.nih.gov taylorandfrancis.metapress.com informaworld.com ingentaconnect.com   | Scholar | More..
  • 81.4Max Coltheart (2005). Commentary: Conscious Experience and Delusional Belief. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (2):153-157.
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 80.4D. H. Mellor (1978). Conscious Belief. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (March):87-101.
    Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 76.2Elisabeth Pacherie, Melissa Green & Timothy J. Bayne (2006). Phenomenology and Delusions: Who Put the 'Alien' in Alien Control? Consciousness and Cognition 15 (3):566-577.
    Current models of delusion converge in proposing that delusional beliefs are based on unusual experiences of various kinds. For example, it is argued that the Capgras delusion (the belief that a known person has been replaced by an impostor) is triggered by an abnormal affective experience in response to seeing a known person; loss of the affective response to a familiar person’s face may lead to the belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis & Young, 1990). (...) Similarly, the Cotard delusion (which involves the belief that one is dead or unreal in some way) may stem from a general.. (shrink)
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: pacherie.free.fr philosophy.ox.ac.uk ncbi.nlm.nih.gov   | Scholar | More..
  • 72.0Andy Egan, Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception.
    Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions.2 One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife (...) is has been replaced by an impostor, we might say that the victim of Capgras delusion believes that it is, in some respects, as if his wife has been replaced by an impostor. Another is to say that we’ve misidentified the attitude that the delusional subject bears to the content of their delusion. So for example, Gregory Currie and co-authors have suggested that rather than believing that his wife has been replaced by an impostor, we should say that the victim of Capgras delusion merely imagines that his wife has been replaced by an impostor.3. (shrink)
    Imagination, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 67.4Paul Franceschi, An Analytic View of Delusion.
    The present article proposes a logical account of delusions, which are regarded as conclusions resulting from fallacious arguments. This leads to distinguish between primary, secondary, ..., n-ary types of delusional arguments. Examples of delusional arguments leading to delusion of reference, delusion of influence, thought-broadcasting delusion and delusion of grandeur are described and then analyzed. This suggests finally a way susceptible of improving the efficiency of cognitive therapy for delusions.
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: cogprints.org   | Scholar | More..
  • 67.2Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & N. Breen (2001). Monothematic Delusions: Towards a Two-Factor Account. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.
    We provide a battery of examples of delusions against which theoretical accounts can be tested. Then, we identify neuropsychological anomalies that could produce the unusual experiences that may lead, in turn, to the delusions in our battery. However, we argue against Maher’s view that delusions are false beliefs that arise as normal responses to anomalous experiences. We propose, instead, that a second factor is required to account for the transition from unusual experience to delusional belief. The second factor in the (...) aetiology of delusions can be described superficially as a loss of the ability to reject a candidate for belief on the grounds of its implausibility and its inconsistency with everything else that the patient knows. But we point out some problems that confront any attempt to say more about the nature of this second factor. (shrink)
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: muse.jhu.edu   | Scholar | More..
  • 63.3N. M. L. Nathan (1982). Conscious Belief. Analysis 42 (March):90-93.
    Conscious Thought in Philosophy of Mind
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation | Scholar | More..
  • 62.8Garry Young (2008). Restating the Role of Phenomenal Experience in the Formation and Maintenance of the Capgras Delusion. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2).
    In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the (...) phenomenology underlying the disorder, both in terms of the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. This paper therefore proposes an interactionist two-stage model in which the phenomenal experience of the Capgras patient is examined, emphasised, and its relation to top-down processing discussed. (shrink)
    Delusions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science
    In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com   | Scholar | More..




  • Applied ethicsEpistemologyMeta-ethicsMetaphysicsNormative ethics
    Philosophy of biologyPhilosophy of languagePhilosophy of mindPhilosophy of religionMore ...
    Home | Blog | New books and articles | Philosophy journals | Forums | The Categorization Project | About PhilPapers | Contact us
    Sponsored by the Joint Information Systems Committee as part of the
    Information Environment Programme

    Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
    All rights reserved by David Bourget and David Chalmers where applicable.

    loading ..