Graduate studies at Western
Erkenntnis 51 (2-3):323-332 (1999)
|Abstract||The Quine-Putnam indispensability argument urges us to place mathematical entities on the same ontological footing as (other) theoretical entities of empirical science. Recently this argument has attracted much criticism, and in this paper I address one criticism due to Elliott Sober. Sober argues that mathematical theories cannot share the empirical support accrued by our best scientific theories, since mathematical propositions are not being tested in the same way as the clearly empirical propositions of science. In this paper I defend the Quine-Putnam argument against Sober's objections.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mark Colyvan (1999). Confirmation Theory and Indispensability. Philosophical Studies 96 (1):1-19.
Richard Pettigrew (2012). Indispensability Arguments and Instrumental Nominalism. The Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):687-709.
Lieven Decock (2002). Quine's Weak and Strong Indispensability Argument. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 33 (2):231-250.
Sam Baron (2013). A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument. Synthese 190 (12):2413-2427.
Michael Resnik (1995). Scientific Vs. Mathematical Realism: The Indispensability Argument. Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.
David Liggins (2008). Quine, Putnam, and the 'Quine-Putnam' Indispensability Argument. Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
Mark Colyvan (1998). In Defence of Indispensability. Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):39-62.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #51,668 of 739,305 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,243 of 739,305 )
How can I increase my downloads?