Content externalism and brute logical error

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (4):pp. 549-574 (2008)
Most content externalists concede that even if externalism is compatible with the thesis that one has authoritative self-knowledge of thought contents, it is incompatible with the stronger claim that one is always able to tell by introspection whether two of one’s thought tokens have the same, or different, content. If one lacks such authoritative discriminative self-knowledge of thought contents, it would seem that brute logical error – non-culpable logical error – is possible. Some philosophers, such as Paul Boghossian, have argued that this would present a big problem for externalism, forcing the externalist to overhaul our norms of rationality. I consider several externalist strategies to block this possibly unhappy epistemological consequence, but I argue that they all fail.
Keywords Self-Knowledge  Content Externalism  Privileged Access
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.0.0031
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1993). Content Preservation. Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Tyler Burge (1988). Individualism and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.
Saul A. Kripke (1979). A Puzzle About Belief. In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel 239--83.

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