David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 136 (2):159-190 (2003)
My paper defends the use of the poverty of stimulus argument (POSA) for linguistic nativism against Cowie's (1999) counter-claim that it leaves empiricism untouched. I first present the linguistic POSA as arising from a reflection on the generality of the child's initial state in comparison with the specific complexity of its final state. I then show that Cowie misconstrues the POSA as a direct argument about the character of the pld. In this light, I first argue that the data Cowie marshals about the pld does not begin to suggest that the POSA is unsound. Second, through a discussion of the so-called `auxiliary inversion rule', I show, by way of diagnosis, that Cowie misunderstands both the methodology of current linguistics and the complexity of the data it is obliged to explain.
|Keywords||Empiricism Linguistics Nativism Science Stimulus Cowie, F|
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Citations of this work BETA
John Collins (2011). Innateness, Canalization, and the Modality-Independence of Language: A Reply to Griffiths and Machery. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):195-206.
John M. Collins (2006). Proxytypes and Linguistic Nativism. Synthese 153 (1):69-104.
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