Confirmation theory and indispensability

Philosophical Studies 96 (1):1-19 (1999)
In this paper I examine Quine''s indispensability argument, with particular emphasis on what is meant by ''indispensable''. I show that confirmation theory plays a crucial role in answering this question and that once indispensability is understood in this light, Quine''s argument is seen to be a serious stumbling block for any scientific realist wishing to maintain an anti-realist position with regard to mathematical entities.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1004248218844
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,904
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Feng Ye (2011). Naturalism and Abstract Entities. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):129-146.
Russell Marcus (2013). Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):163 - 183.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

181 ( #7,931 of 1,725,465 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

138 ( #3,005 of 1,725,465 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.