Confirmation theory and indispensability

Philosophical Studies 96 (1):1-19 (1999)
Abstract
In this paper I examine Quine''s indispensability argument, with particular emphasis on what is meant by ''indispensable''. I show that confirmation theory plays a crucial role in answering this question and that once indispensability is understood in this light, Quine''s argument is seen to be a serious stumbling block for any scientific realist wishing to maintain an anti-realist position with regard to mathematical entities.
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Citations of this work BETA
Feng Ye (2011). Naturalism and Abstract Entities. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):129-146.
Russell Marcus (2013). Intrinsic Explanation and Field's Dispensabilist Strategy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):163 - 183.
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