Defeasible reasoning and logic programming
Minds and Machines 1 (4):417-436 (1991)
| Abstract | The general conditions of epistemic defeat are naturally represented through the interplay of two distinct kinds of entailment, deductive and defeasible. Many of the current approaches to modeling defeasible reasoning seek to define defeasible entailment via model-theoretic notions like truth and satisfiability, which, I argue, fails to capture this fundamental distinction between truthpreserving and justification-preserving entailments. I present an alternative account of defeasible entailment and show how logic programming offers a paradigm in which the distinction can be captured, allowing for the modeling of a larger range of types of defeat. This is possible through a natural extension of the declarative and procedural semantics of Horn clauses. | |||||||||
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Katalin Bimbó (2007). $LE^{T}{Rightarrow}$ , $LR^{Circ}{Wedgesim}$ , LK and Cutfree Proofs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (5):557 - 570.
Robert L. Causey (1991). The Epistemic Basis of Defeasible Reasoning. Minds and Machines 1 (4):437-458.
G. Aldo Antonelli (2005). Grounded Consequence for Defeasible Logic. Cambridge University Press.
John L. Pollock (1991). Self-Defeating Arguments. Minds and Machines 1 (4):367-392.
Robert A. Kowalski & Francesca Toni (1996). Abstract Argumentation. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):275-296.
P. X. Monaghan (2010). A Novel Interpretation of Plato's Theory of Forms. Metaphysica 11 (1):63-78.
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