Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments

Episteme 11 (2):199-212 (2014)
In epistemology, fake-barn thought experiments are often taken to be intuitively clear cases in which a justified true belief does not qualify as knowledge. We report a study designed to determine whether non-philosophers share this intuition. The data suggest that while participants are less inclined to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases than in unproblematic cases of knowledge, they nonetheless do attribute knowledge to protagonists in fake-barn cases. Moreover, the intuition that fake-barn cases do count as knowledge is negatively correlated with age; older participants are less likely than younger participants to attribute knowledge in fake-barn cases. We also found that increasing the number of defeaters (fakes) does not decrease the inclination to attribute knowledge.
Keywords experimental philosophy  epistemology  intuitions  fake-barn cases  age differences
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DOI 10.1017/epi.2014.7
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1996). Elusive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Joshua Knobe (2007). Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):81–92.

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Citations of this work BETA
Helen De Cruz (2015). Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.

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