Evolutionary Moral Realism

Biological Theory 7 (3):218-226 (2013)
Abstract
Evolutionary moral realism is the view that there are moral values with roots in evolution that are both specifically moral and exist independently of human belief systems. In beginning to sketch the outlines of such a view, we examine moral goods like fairness and empathetic caring as valuable and real aspects of the environments of species that are intelligent and social, or at least developing along an evolutionary trajectory that could lead to a level of intelligence that would enable individual members of the species to recognize and respond to such things as the moral goods they in fact are. We suggest that what is most morally interesting and important from a biological perspective is the existence and development of such trajectories, rather than the position of one particular species, such as our own, on one particular trajectory
Keywords Error theory  Ethics  Evolution  Moral beliefs  Moral naturalism  Moral realism  Moral values  Morality
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    Joseph E. Brenner (2010). A Logic of Ethical Information. Knowledge, Technology and Policy 23 (1-2):109-133.
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