G. E. Moore and Bad Faith

European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):347-365 (2012)
Abstract: G. E. Moore claimed to know a variety of commonsense propositions. He is often accused of being dogmatic or of begging the question against philosophers who deny that he knows such things. In this paper, I argue that this accusation is mistaken. I argue that Moore is instead guilty of answering questions of the form ‘Do I know p?’ in bad faith
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References found in this work BETA
William G. Lycan (2001). Moore Against the New Skeptics. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):35 - 53.
Norman Malcolm (1949). Defending Common Sense. Philosophical Review 58 (3):201-220.

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