David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 20 (2):183-202 (2010)
According to John Haugeland, the capacity for “authentic intentionality” depends on a commitment to constitutive standards of objectivity. One of the consequences of Haugeland’s view is that a neurocomputational explanation cannot be adequate to understand “authentic intentionality”. This paper gives grounds to resist such a consequence. It provides the beginning of an account of authentic intentionality in terms of neurocomputational enabling conditions. It argues that the standards, which constitute the domain of objects that can be represented, reflect the statistical structure of the environments where brain sensory systems evolved and develop. The objection that I equivocate on what Haugeland means by “commitment to standards” is rebutted by introducing the notion of “florid, self-conscious representing”. Were the hypothesis presented plausible, computational neuroscience would offer a promising framework for a better understanding of the conditions for meaningful representation.
|Keywords||Authentic intentionality Constitutive standards of objectivity John Haugeland Neural representation Visual perception|
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References found in this work BETA
Patricia S. Churchland (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Citations of this work BETA
Matteo Colombo (2014). Explaining Social Norm Compliance. A Plea for Neural Representations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):217-238.
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