Innateness, canalization, and the modality-independence of language: A reply to Griffiths and Machery
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):195-206 (2011)
Griffiths and Machery (2008) argue that innateness is a ?folk biological? notion, which, as such, has no useful reconstruction in contemporary biology. If this is so, not only is it wrong to identify the vernacular notion with the precise theoretical concept of canalization, but worse, it would appear that many of the putative scientific claims for particular competences and capacities being innate are simply misplaced. The present paper challenges the core substantive claim of Griffiths and Machery's position, namely, that innateness understood on canalization lines as environment-independent development (somehow and to some degree) is a confused, outmoded notion. It will be contended that the modality-independence of language offers a prima facie case against Griffiths and Machery's general position
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Steven Pinker (1995). The Language Instinct. Harper Perennial.
Ron Amundson (2005). The Changing Role of the Embryo in Evolutionary Thought: Roots of Evo-Devo. Cambridge University Press.
John M. Collins (2003). Cowie on the Poverty of Stimulus. Synthese 136 (2):159-190.
Citations of this work BETA
John M. Collins (2005). Faculty Disputes. Mind and Language 19 (5):503-33.
Similar books and articles
Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2009). Should We Eliminate the Innate? Reply to Griffiths and Machery. Philosophical Psychology 22 (4):505 – 519.
Paul E. Griffiths & Edouard Machery (2008). Innateness, Canalization, and 'Biologicizing the Mind'. Philosophical Psychology 21 (3):397 – 414.
Jonathan Birch (2009). Irretrievably Confused? Innateness in Explanatory Context. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 40 (4):296-301.
John M. Collins (2005). Nativism: In Defense of a Biological Understanding. Philosophical Psychology 18 (2):157-177.
Paul Griffiths, Edouard Machery & Stefan Linquist (2009). The Vernacular Concept of Innateness. Mind and Language 24 (5):605-630.
Jonathan M. Weinberg & Ron Mallon (2008). Living with Innateness (and Environmental Dependence Too). Philosophical Psychology 21 (3):415 – 424.
Nicholas Shea (2012). Genetic Representation Explains the Cluster of Innateness-Related Properties. Mind and Language 27 (4):466-493.
Andre Ariew (1999). Innateness is Canalization: In Defense of a Developmental Account of Innateness. In Philosophy of Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA S19-S27.
James A. McGilvray (2006). On the Innateness of Language. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing 97--112.
Henry Rosemont (1978). Gathering Evidence for Linguistic Innateness. Synthese 38 (May):127-148.
Noam A. Chomsky & Jerrold J. Katz (1975). On Innateness: A Reply to Cooper. Philosophical Review 84 (January):70-87.
Denise D. Cummins (1996). Evidence for the Innateness of Deontic Reasoning. Mind and Language 11 (2):160-90.
Added to index2011-04-06
Total downloads32 ( #125,177 of 1,907,930 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #462,165 of 1,907,930 )
How can I increase my downloads?