In defence of indispensability
Philosophia Mathematica 6 (1):39-62 (1998)
| Abstract | Indispensability arguments for realism about mathematical entities have come under serious attack in recent years. To my mind the most profound attack has come from Penelope Maddy, who argues that scientific/mathematical practice doesn't support the key premise of the indispensability argument, that is, that we ought to have ontological commitment to those entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories. In this paper I defend the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument against Maddy's objections. | |||||||||
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