Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):283-295 (1999)
|Abstract||Stephen Pinker sets out over a dozen arguments in The language instinct (Morrow, New York, 1994) for his widely shared view that natural language is inadequate as a medium for thought. Thus he argues we must suppose that the primary medium of thought and inference is an innate propositional representation system, mentalese. I reply to the various arguments and so defend the view that some thought essentially involves natural language. I argue mentalese doesn't solve any of the problems Pinker cites for the view that we think in natural language. So I don't think I think the way he thinks I think|
|Keywords||Language Mental Science Fodor, J Pinker, S|
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