I don't think so: Pinker on the mentalese monopoly

Philosophical Psychology 12 (3):283-295 (1999)
Stephen Pinker sets out over a dozen arguments in The language instinct (Morrow, New York, 1994) for his widely shared view that natural language is inadequate as a medium for thought. Thus he argues we must suppose that the primary medium of thought and inference is an innate propositional representation system, mentalese. I reply to the various arguments and so defend the view that some thought essentially involves natural language. I argue mentalese doesn't solve any of the problems Pinker cites for the view that we think in natural language. So I don't think I think the way he thinks I think
Keywords Language  Mental  Science  Fodor, J  Pinker, S
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/095150899105765
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,280
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
William S. Robinson (2005). Thoughts Without Distinctive Non-Imagistic Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):534-561.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

74 ( #64,476 of 1,932,461 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #132,655 of 1,932,461 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.