David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (4):625 - 658 (2007)
The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an eschewal of folk understanding. The latter half of the paper argues that, contrary to the received view, Chomsky's review of Skinner offers not just an argument against Skinner's eliminativism, but, more centrally, one in favour of the second eliminativism
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References found in this work BETA
Noam Chomsky (1982). A Note on the Creative Aspect of Language Use. Philosophical Review 91 (3):423-434.
Noam Chomsky (1968). Quine's Empirical Assumptions. Synthese 19 (1-2):53 - 68.
Noam A. Chomsky & Jerrold J. Katz (1975). On Innateness: A Reply to Cooper. Philosophical Review 84 (January):70-87.
Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
Frances Egan (1995). Computation and Content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.
Citations of this work BETA
Frances Egan (2013). How to Think About Mental Content. Philosophical Studies (1):1-21.
Frances Egan (2010). Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.
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