Meta-scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior

Abstract
The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an eschewal of folk understanding. The latter half of the paper argues that, contrary to the received view, Chomsky's review of Skinner offers not just an argument against Skinner's eliminativism, but, more centrally, one in favour of the second eliminativism
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References found in this work BETA
Frances Egan (1995). Computation and Content. Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.

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Citations of this work BETA
Frances Egan (2010). Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.
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