Naturalising normativity

In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press (2009)
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Abstract

In this paper I discuss the problem of providing an account of the normative force of theories of rationality. The theories considered are theories of rational inference, rational belief and rational decision— logic, probability theory and decision theory, respectively. I provide a naturalistic account of the normativity of these theories that is not viciously circular. The account offered does have its limitations though: it delivers a defeasible account of rationality. On this view, theories of rational inference, belief and decision are not a priori . Rather, they are a posteriori and may change over time. Finally, I compare this approach with another that emerges from the Ramsey-Lewis approach to defining theoretical terms.

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Mark Colyvan
University of Sydney

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Is religion natural? Religion, naturalism and near-naturalism.Thomas J. Spiegel - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophy and Theology 81 (4):351-368.

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