On the immunity principle: a view from a robot

Abstract In his excellent and thought provoking article Gallagher (2000) suggests that there are no exceptions to the immunity principle, that one cannot use the first person pronoun and be incorrect in one's reference. He discusses Wittgenstein's differentiation between the "I"‚ as subject and as object, and suggests that misidentification may be possible in the latter instance, when one is, for instance, viewing an arm moving and incorrectly thinks it one's own. In amplifying this distinction Gallagher introduces the two related aspects of (minimal) self awareness: a sense of agency, (the sense that I am the initiator of an act), and a sense of ownership, (the sense that it is my body that is moving).
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    Marina Folescu & James Higginbotham (2012). Two Takes on the De Se. In Simon Prosser & Francois Recanati (eds.), Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press.
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