Graduate studies at Western
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):309-311 (2008)
|Abstract||My claim is clear and unambiguous: no machine will pass a well-designed Turing Test unless we find some means of embedding it in lived social life. We have no idea how to do this but my argument, and all our evidence, suggests that it will not be a necessary condition that the machine have more than a minimal body. Exactly how minimal is still being worked out|
|Keywords||embodiment Turing Test GOFAI Selinger Dreyfus|
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