Self-knowledge and commitments

Synthese 171 (3):365 - 375 (2009)
Abstract
In this paper I provide an outline of a new kind of constitutive account of self-knowledge. It is argued that in order for the model properly to explain transparency, a further category of propositional attitudes—called “commitments”—has to be countenanced. It is also maintained that constitutive theories can’t remain neutral on the issue of the possession of psychological concepts, and a proposal about the possession of the concept of belief is sketched. Finally, it is claimed that in order for a constitutive account properly to explain authority, it has to take a rather dramatic constructivist turn, which makes it suitable as an explanation of self-knowledge only for a limited class of mental states.
Keywords Self-knowledge  Constitutive accounts  Beliefs  Commitments  Transparency  Authority  Self-deception  Constructivism
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References found in this work BETA
Akeel Bilgrami (2000). Self-Knowledge and Resentment. Knowing Our Own Minds (October):207-243.
Paul Boghossian (1989). Content and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17 (1):5-26.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pascal Engel (2010). Self-Ascriptions of Belief and Transparency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
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