The argument from the finer-grained content of colour experiences: A redefinition of its role within the debate between McDowell and non-conceptual theorists
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialectica 57 (1):57-70 (2003)
In this paper I address the question of whether the fact that our colour experiences have a finer‐grained content than our ordinary colour concepts allow us to represent should be taken as a threat to theories of the conceptual content of experience. In particular, I consider and criticise McDowell's response to that argument and propose a possible development of it. As a consequence, I claim that the role of the argument from the finer‐grained content of experience has to be redefined. In particular, I acknowledge that this problem is helpful in order to bring to the fore the issue of the proper characterisation of the constraints upon the possession conditions of perceptual demonstrative concepts. Yet, I contend that, in light of the foregoing discussion, it is neutral with respect to the dispute between conceptual and non‐conceptual theorists. For that dispute hinges on whether it is possible to have experiences with a certain content independently of having the concepts, which are needed for its canonical specification and not on whether those experiences are conceptualisable in all their finesse of grain
|Keywords||Color Conceptualism Content Experience Metaphysics Mcdowell, J|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Christopher Peacocke (1983). Sense and Content: Experience, Thought, and Their Relations. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Philippe Chuard (2006). Demonstrative Concepts Without Reidentification. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):153-201.
Annalisa Coliva (2012). Human Diagrammatic Reasoning and Seeing-As. Synthese 186 (1):121-148.
Similar books and articles
Christopher Peacocke (2001). Phenomenology and Nonconceptual Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):609-615.
Refeng Tang (2010). Conceptualism and the New Myth of the Given. Synthese 175 (1):101 - 122.
Sean D. Kelly (2001). The Non-Conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):601-608.
Michael D. Barber (2008). Holism and Horizon: Husserl and McDowell on Non-Conceptual Content. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 24 (2):79-97.
Dennis Schulting (2010). Kant, Non-Conceptuele Inhoud En Synthese. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 72 (4):679-715.
Hemdat Lerman (2010). Non-Conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-Giving. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):1-23.
Josefa Toribio (2002). Perceptual Experience and its Contents. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (4):375-392.
Cheryl K. Chen (2006). Empirical Content and Rational Constraint. Inquiry 49 (3):242 – 264.
Alex Byrne (2005). Perception and Conceptual Content. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell 231--250.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #78,604 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #99,332 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?