Graduate studies at Western
Minds and Machines 4 (3):283-302 (1994)
|Abstract||I present a theory of the nature and basis of the conscious experience characteristic of occurent propositional attitudes: thinking this or that. As a preliminary I offer an extended criticism of Paul Schweizer's treatment of such consciousness as unexplained secondary qualities of neural events. I also attempt to rebut arguments against the possibility of functionalist accounts of conscious experience and qualia|
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Physicalism Qualia Thought|
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