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  • David J. Cole (1994). Thought and Qualia. Minds and Machines 4 (3):283-302.
    Conscious Thought in Philosophy of Mind
    Qualia in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 94.5William J. Greenberg (1998). On Chalmers' "Principle of Organizational Invariance" and His "Dancing Qualia" and "Fading Qualia" Thought Experiments. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (1):53-58.
    Functionalism and Qualia in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 87.0Mr D. M. Nicholson, From a Flaw in the Knowledge Argument to a Physicalist Account of Qualia.
    The Knowledge argument based on the grey Mary thought experiment cannot be claimed as a basis for rejecting physicalism. First, because it is flawed, being so formulated as to predetermine the outcome of the thought experiment in favour of a refutation of physicalism. Second, because, once this is recognised, it becomes clear that there is one - and only one - account of the qualia-physical relationship that will permit physicalism to survive the thought experiment itself. It is suggested that the (...) position in question is worthy of further consideration as a reasonable candidate theory for a physicalist account of qualia. (shrink)
    The Knowledge Argument in Philosophy of Mind
    Qualia in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 79.8Stephen Leeds (1993). Qualia, Awareness, Sellars. Noûs 27 (3):303-330.
    Knowledge of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
    Wilfrid Sellars in 20th Century Philosophy
    Qualia, Misc in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 79.2Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
    Epiphenomenalism in Philosophy of Mind
    The Knowledge Argument in Philosophy of Mind
    Qualia in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 79.0Paul Schweizer (1996). Physicalism, Functionalism, and Conscious Thought. Minds and Machines 6 (1):61-87.
    Functionalism about Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 78.9Joseph Levine (1988). Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited. Mind and Language 3:271-87.
    Absent Qualia in Philosophy of Mind
    The Inverted Spectrum in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 78.1David J. Chalmers (1995). Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
    It is widely accepted that conscious experience has a physical basis. That is, the properties of experience (phenomenal properties, or qualia) systematically depend on physical properties according to some lawful relation. There are two key questions about this relation. The first concerns the strength of the laws: are they logically or metaphysically necessary, so that consciousness is nothing "over and above" the underlying physical process, or are they merely contingent laws like the law of gravity? This question about the strength (...) of the psychophysical link is the basis for debates over physicalism and property dualism. The second question concerns the shape of the laws: precisely how do phenomenal properties depend on physical properties? What sort of physical properties enter into the laws' antecedents, for instance; consequently, what sort of physical systems can give rise to conscious experience? It is this second question that I address in this paper. (shrink)
    Functionalism and Qualia in Philosophy of Mind
    Absent Qualia in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 77.5Neil Campbell (2000). Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States. Synthese 124 (2):239-256.
    The Inverted Spectrum in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 77.2 P (2002). Physicalism, Qualia and Mental Concepts. Theoria 17 (44):359-379.
    Qualia and Materialism in Philosophy of Mind
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  • 76.4Sydney Shoemaker (1975). Functionalism and Qualia. Philosophical Studies 27 (May):291-315.
    Absent Qualia in Philosophy of Mind
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