David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 45 (May):431-44 (1984)
Thought experiments have been used by philosophers for centuries, especially in the study of personal identity where they appear to have been used extensively and indiscriminately. Despite their prevalence, the use of thought experiments in this area of philosophy has been criticized in recent times. Bernard Williams criticizes the conclusions that are drawn from some experiments, and retells one of these experiments from a different perspective, a retelling which leads to a seemingly opposing result. Wilkes criticizes the method of thought experimentation itself, suggesting that the results drawn from the experiments are tainted by a faulty method. This paper examines both these types of objection, and concludes that neither can be sustained
|Keywords||Artificial Intelligence Epistemology Experiment Minds Thought|
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Citations of this work BETA
David J. Cole (1991). Artificial Intelligence and Personal Identity. Synthese 88 (September):399-417.
David J. Cole (1994). Thought and Qualia. Minds and Machines 4 (3):283-302.
Dale Jacquette (1990). Fear and Loathing (and Other Intentional States) in Searle's Chinese Room. Philosophical Psychology 3 (2 & 3):287-304.
J. Christopher Maloney (1987). The Right Stuff. Synthese 70 (March):349-72.
Larry Hauser (1993). Reaping the Whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.
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