The experimenter's regress as philosophical sociology

I will divide my discussion into two. In the first part I will discuss Godin and Gingras's delicious claim that the experimenter's regress is anticipated by Sextus Empiricus's formulation of scepticism. In the second part, I will try to deal with Godin and Gingras's ‘critical argument’, that the experimenter's regress would be redundant if we were less concerned with ‘frightening philosophers’
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DOI 10.1016/S0039-3681(01)00033-4
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H. M. Collins (1994). A Strong Confirmation of the Experimenters' Regress. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 25 (3):493-503.

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