Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):497-536 (2002)
|Abstract||There is an incompatibility between the deflationist approach to truth, which makes truth transparent on the basis of an antecedent grasp of meaning, and the traditional endeavour, exemplified by Davidson, to explicate meaning through of truth. I suggest that both parties are in the explanatory red: deflationist lack a non-truth-involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a non-deflationary account of truth. My focus is on the attempts of the latter party to resolve their problem. I look in detail at Davidson's more recent work and suggest that it seeks to articulate a primitive notion of truth that may balance between a notion that collapses into deflationism and one that is wholly subsumed under a general theory of interpretation. I conclude that this tightrope walk is ultimately unsuccessful. Equally, however, some reasons are provided for thinking that deflationism might be equally unsuccessful with its problem. 'Truth or meaning?' remains an open question|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
C. Travis (1996). Meaning's Role in Truth. Mind 105 (419):451-466.
Andrew Thomas (2011). Deflationism and the Dependence of Truth on Reality. Erkenntnis 75 (1):113-122.
Mark Schroeder (forthcoming). Hard Cases for Combining Expressivism and Deflationist Truth: Conditionals and Epistemic Modals. In Steven Gross & Michael Williams (eds.), (unknown). Oxford.
Paul Horwich (2010). Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford University Press.
Scott Soames (2008). Truth and Meaning: In Perspective. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):1-19.
Douglas Patterson (2005). Deflationism and the Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271 - 294.
Huw Price (1997). What Should a Deflationist About Truth Say About Meaning? Philosophical Issues 8:107-115.
Claire Horisk, Dorit Bar-On & William G. Lycan (2000). Deflationism, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 101 (1):1 - 28.
Kari Middleton (2007). The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #30,718 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?