David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):497-536 (2002)
There is an incompatibility between the deflationist approach to truth, which makes truth transparent on the basis of an antecedent grasp of meaning, and the traditional endeavour, exemplified by Davidson, to explicate meaning through of truth. I suggest that both parties are in the explanatory red: deflationist lack a non-truth-involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a non-deflationary account of truth. My focus is on the attempts of the latter party to resolve their problem. I look in detail at Davidson's more recent work and suggest that it seeks to articulate a primitive notion of truth that may balance between a notion that collapses into deflationism and one that is wholly subsumed under a general theory of interpretation. I conclude that this tightrope walk is ultimately unsuccessful. Equally, however, some reasons are provided for thinking that deflationism might be equally unsuccessful with its problem. 'Truth or meaning?' remains an open question.
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References found in this work BETA
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
Michael A. E. Dummett (1978). Truth and Other Enigmas. Harvard University Press.
W. V. Quine (1986). Philosophy of Logic. Harvard University Press.
Paul Horwich (1998). Truth. Clarendon Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Claire Horisk (2008). Truth, Meaning, and Circularity. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269 - 300.
Alexis Burgess (2011). Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.
David Löwenstein (2012). Davidsonian Semantics and Anaphoric Deflationism. Dialectica 66 (1):23-44.
John Collins (2002). On the Proposed Exhaustion of Truth. Dialogue 41 (4):653.
Claire Horisk (2008). Truth, Meaning, and Circularity. Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269-300.
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