The phenomenology of agency and intention in the face of paralysis and insentience
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):309-325 (2007)
| Abstract | Studies of perception have focussed on sensation, though more recently the perception of action has, once more, become the subject of investigation. These studies have looked at acute experimental situations. The present paper discusses the subjective experience of those with either clinical syndromes of loss of movement or sensation (spinal cord injury, sensory neuronopathy syndrome or motor stroke), or with experimental paralysis or sensory loss. The differing phenomenology of these is explored and their effects on intention and agency discussed. It is shown that sensory loss can have effects on the focussing of motor command and that for some a sense of agency can return despite paralysis | |||||||||
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Alfred R. Mele (2001). Michael E. Bratman, Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency:Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Ethics 111 (2):400-403.
Pamela Hieronymi (2006). Controlling Attitudes. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):45-74.
Patrick Haggard & S. Clark (2003). Intentional Action: Conscious Experience and Neural Prediction. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):695-707.
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Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency. Psyche 13 (1):1 - 30.
Tim Bayne (2008). The Phenomenology of Agency. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
Timothy J. Bayne & Neil Levy (2006). The Feeling of Doing: Deconstructing the Phenomenology of Agnecy. In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. MIT Press.
Jonathan Cole (2009). Impaired Embodiment and Intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3).
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