The philosophical significance of Cox's theorem
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cox’s theorem states that, under certain assumptions, any measure of belief is isomorphic to a probability measure. This theorem, although intended as a justification of the subjectivist interpretation of probability theory, is sometimes presented as an argument for more controversial theses. Of particular interest is the thesis that the only coherent means of representing uncertainty is via the probability calculus. In this paper I examine the logical assumptions of Cox’s theorem and I show how these impinge on the philosophical conclusions thought to be supported by the theorem. I show that the more controversial thesis is not supported by Cox’s theorem.
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Mark Colyvan (2013). Idealisations in Normative Models. Synthese 190 (8):1337-1350.
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