Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience
Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313 (2011)
|Abstract||How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction between foreground and background bodily feelings to characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity, as opposed to accounts that imply that absorption involves bodily inconspicuousness.|
|Keywords||pre-reflective self-awareness self-presentation emotion|
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