Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313 (2011)
How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction between foreground and background bodily feelings to characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity, as opposed to accounts that imply that absorption involves bodily inconspicuousness.
|Keywords||pre-reflective self-awareness self-presentation emotion|
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References found in this work BETA
Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
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Citations of this work BETA
Doris McIlwain, John Sutton & Wayne Christensen (2015). Putting Pressure on Theories of Choking: Towards an Expanded Perspective on Breakdown in Skilled Performance. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (2):253-293.
Doris McIlwain & John Sutton (2013). Yoga From the Mat Up: How Words Alight on Bodies. Educational Philosophy and Theory (6):1-19.
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