Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience

Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313 (2011)
Abstract
How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction between foreground and background bodily feelings to characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity, as opposed to accounts that imply that absorption involves bodily inconspicuousness.
Keywords pre-reflective self-awareness  self-presentation  emotion
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References found in this work BETA
Aron Gurwitsch (1964). Field Of Consciousness. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

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