Varieties of Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness: Foreground and Background Bodily Feelings in Emotion Experience
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Inquiry 54 (3):293 - 313 (2011)
How do we feel our body in emotion experience? In this paper I initially distinguish between foreground and background bodily feelings, and characterize them in some detail. Then I compare this distinction with the one between reflective and pre-reflective bodily self-awareness one finds in some recent philosophical phenomenological works, and conclude that both foreground and background bodily feelings can be understood as pre-reflective modes of bodily self-awareness that nevertheless differ in degree of self-presentation or self-intimation. Finally, I use the distinction between foreground and background bodily feelings to characterize the experience of being absorbed in an activity, as opposed to accounts that imply that absorption involves bodily inconspicuousness.
|Keywords||pre-reflective self-awareness self-presentation emotion|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Aron Gurwitsch (1964). The Field of Consciousness. Duquesne University Press.
Mark Johnson (2007). The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding. University of Chicago Press.
Dorothée Legrand (2005). Transparently Oneself: Commentary on Metzinger's Being No-One. Psyche 11 (5).
Dorothee Peggy Martine Legrand (2007). Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness: On Being Bodily in the World. Janus Head 9 (2):493-519.
Barbara Montero (2010). Does Bodily Awareness Interfere with Highly Skilled Movement? Inquiry 53 (2):105 – 122.
Citations of this work BETA
Doris McIlwain & John Sutton (2013). Yoga From the Mat Up: How Words Alight on Bodies. Educational Philosophy and Theory:1-19.
Similar books and articles
Dorothée Legrand (2006). The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
Dorothée Legrand & Susanne Ravn (2009). Perceiving Subjectivity in Bodily Movement: The Case of Dancers. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (3):389-408.
Georg Northoff (2007). Subcortical Regions and the Self. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):100-101.
Joel Krueger (2006). Concrete Consciousness: A Sartrean Critique of Functionalist Accounts of Mind. Sartre Studies International 12 (2):44-60.
Jan Slaby (2008). Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):429-444.
Nico H. Frijda (2009). Emotion Experience and its Varieties. Emotion Review 1 (3):264-271.
John Schwenkler (2013). The Objects of Bodily Awareness. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.
Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 157--180.
Matthew Ratcliffe (2005). William James on Emotion and Intentionality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (2):179-202.
Michael Kelly (2002). Self-Awareness and Ontological Monism. Idealistic Studies 32 (3):237-254.
Thor Grunbaum (2008). The Body in Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):243-261.
Giovanna Colombetti & Evan Thompson (forthcoming). The Feeling Body: Towards an Enactive Approach to Emotion. In W. F. Overton, U. Mueller & J. Newman (eds.), Body in Mind, Mind in Body: Developmental Perspectives on Embodiment and Consciousness. Erlbaum.
Peter Goldie (2002). Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.
Added to index2011-05-14
Total downloads120 ( #7,812 of 1,100,944 )
Recent downloads (6 months)15 ( #11,233 of 1,100,944 )
How can I increase my downloads?