Was Wittgenstein an epistemic relativist?

Philosophical Investigations 33 (1):1-23 (2010)
The paper reviews the grounds for relativist interpretations of Wittgenstein's later thought, especially in On Certainty . It distinguishes between factual and virtual forms of epistemic relativism and argues that, on closer inspection, Wittgenstein's notes don't support any form of relativism – let it be factual or virtual. In passing, it considers also so-called "naturalist" readings of On Certainty , which may lend support to a relativist interpretation of Wittgenstein's ideas, finds them wanting, and recommends to interpret his positive proposal in On Certainty as a form of "internal rationalism.".
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2009.01394.x
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Annalisa Coliva (2013). Replies. Philosophia 41 (1):81-96.

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