Is Evidence Knowledge?

Abstract
We argue that if evidence were knowledge, then there wouldn’t be any Gettier cases, and justification would fail to be closed in egregious ways. But there are Gettier cases, and justification does not fail to be close in egregious ways. Therefore, evidence isn’t knowledge.
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References found in this work BETA
Richard Feldman (1974). An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):68 – 69.
Richard Feldman (1995). In Defence of Closure. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):487-494.
Robert K. Shope (1983). The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sven Bernecker (2011). Keeping Track of the Gettier Problem. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):127-152.
Nick Hughes (2014). Consistency and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 169 (2):333-338.
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