Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):447 - 454 (2010)
|Abstract||We argue that if evidence were knowledge, then there wouldn’t be any Gettier cases, and justification would fail to be closed in egregious ways. But there are Gettier cases, and justification does not fail to be close in egregious ways. Therefore, evidence isn’t knowledge.|
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