Justified vs. warranted perceptual belief: Resisting disjunctivism
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383 (2005)
| Abstract | I argue that one reason for being a disjunctivist advanced by McDowell (having to do with the indefeasibility of perceptual knowledge) fails because it ignores the distinction between justification and warrant. | |||||||||
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Juan Comesaña (2005). Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
Juan Comesaña (2005). Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
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