David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76 (2005)
In this paper I argue against Mentalism, the claim that all the factors that contribute to the epistemic justification of a doxastic attitude towards a proposition by a subject S are mental states of S. My objection to mentalism is that there is a special kind of fact (what I call a "support fact") that contributes to the justification of any belief, and that is not mental. My argument against mentalism, then, is the following: Anti-mentalism argument: 1. If mentalism is true, then support facts are mental. 2. Support facts are not mental. Therefore, 3. Mentalism is not true. In what follows I explain what support facts are, and then defend each of the premises of my argument. I conclude with some remarks regarding the relevance of my argument for the larger internalism/externalism debate(s) in epistemology.
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Matthew S. Bedke (2010). Might All Normativity Be Queer? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):41-58.
Colin Ruloff (2009). Epistemic Supervenience and Internalism: A Trilemma. Theoria 75 (2):129-151.
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