Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419 (2013)
|Abstract||The Simple Counterfactual Analysis (SCA) was once considered the most promising analysis of disposition ascriptions. According to SCA, disposition ascriptions are to be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals. In the last few decades, however, SCA has become the target of a battery of counterexamples. In all counterexamples, something seems to be interfering with a certain object’s having or not having a certain disposition thus making the truth-values of the disposition ascription and of its associated counterfactual come apart. Intuitively, however, it would seem that, if all interferences were absent, the disposition ascription and its associated conditional would have the same truth-value. Although this idea may seem obvious, it is far from obvious how to implement it. In fact, it has become widely assumed that the content of qualifying ceteris paribus clauses (such as ‘if all interferences were absent’) cannot be specified in a clear and non-circular manner. In this paper, I will argue that this assumption is wrong. I will develop an analysis of disposition ascriptions, the Interference-Free Counterfactual Analysis, which relies on a clear and non-circular definition of the notion of interference and avoids the standard counterexamples to SCA while vindicating the intuition that disposition ascriptions and counterfactual conditionals are intimately related|
|Keywords||Dispositions Disposition ascriptions Interferences Finks Mimicks Masks Antidotes Intrinsic dispositions Extrinsic dispositions Ceteris paribus clauses|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Markus Schrenk (2007). Can Capacities Rescue Us From Ceteris Paribus Laws? In B. Gnassounou & M. Kistler (eds.), Dispositions in Philosophy and Science. Ashgate.
Alexander Bird (2004). Antidotes All the Way Down? Theoria 19 (3):259-269.
Jan Hauska (2009). Dispositions Unmasked. Theoria 75 (4):304-335.
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2010). Conditional and Habitual Analyses of Disposition Ascriptions. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):624-630.
Alexander Bird (2004). Antidotes All the Way Down? Theoria 19 (3):259–69.
Jaeho Lee (2010). Disposition, Explanation, and Causation—A Defense of the Reformed Conditional Analysis of Disposition. Philosophia 38 (3):569-577.
Robert Kowalenko (2009). How (Not) to Think About Idealisation and Ceteris Paribus -Laws. Synthese 167 (1):183 - 201.
Justin C. Fisher (2013). Dispositions, Conditionals and Auspicious Circumstances. Philosophical Studies 164 (2):443-464.
Sungho Choi (2008). Dispositional Properties and Counterfactual Conditionals. Mind 117 (468):795-841.
Tobias Hansson (2006). Too Many Dispositional Properties. Sats - Northern European Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):37-42.
Steven Yalowitz (2000). A Dispositional Account of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):249-278.
Sungho Choi (2006). The Simple Vs. Reformed Conditional Analysis of Dispositions. Synthese 148 (2):369 - 379.
Jon D. Ringen (1982). The Explanatory Import of Dispositions: A Defense of Scientific Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:122 - 133.
Ian Thompson (2011). Derivative Dispositions and Multiple Generative Levels. In Mauricio Suarez (ed.), Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics.
Added to index2012-04-25
Total downloads189 ( #1,960 of 722,929 )
Recent downloads (6 months)48 ( #1,287 of 722,929 )
How can I increase my downloads?