Do Extrinsic Dispositions Need Extrinsic Causal Bases?

Abstract
In this paper, I distinguish two often-conflated theses—the thesis that all dispositions are intrinsic properties and the thesis that the causal bases of all dispositions are intrinsic properties—and argue that the falsity of the former does not entail the falsity of the latter. In particular, I argue that extrinsic dispositions are a counterexample to first thesis but not necessarily to the second thesis, because an extrinsic disposition does not need to include any extrinsic property in its causal basis. I conclude by drawing some general lessons about the nature of dispositions and their relation to their causal bases
Keywords Dispositions  Causal Bases  Extrinsic Dispositions  Functionalism About Dispositions  Identity Theory of Dispositions
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Fara, Dispositions. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.

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Citations of this work BETA
Gabriele Contessa (2013). Dispositions and Interferences. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):401-419.
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