Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):622-638 (2012)
|Abstract||In this paper, I distinguish two often-conflated theses—the thesis that all dispositions are intrinsic properties and the thesis that the causal bases of all dispositions are intrinsic properties—and argue that the falsity of the former does not entail the falsity of the latter. In particular, I argue that extrinsic dispositions are a counterexample to first thesis but not necessarily to the second thesis, because an extrinsic disposition does not need to include any extrinsic property in its causal basis. I conclude by drawing some general lessons about the nature of dispositions and their relation to their causal bases|
|Keywords||Dispositions Causal Bases Extrinsic Dispositions Functionalism About Dispositions Identity Theory of Dispositions|
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