David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 24 (3):243-258 (2011)
We seem perfectly able to perceive fine-grained shades of colour even without possessing precise concepts for them. The same might be said of shapes. I argue that this is in fact not the case. A subject can perceive a colour or shape only if she possesses a concept of that type of colour or shape. I provide new justification for this thesis, and do not rely on demonstrative concepts such as THIS SHADE or THAT SHAPE, a move first suggested by John McDowell, but rejected by Christopher Peacocke and Richard Heck among others.1
|Keywords||Perception Concepts Color Richness Demonstratives|
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Kevin Connolly (2014). Which Kantian Conceptualism (or Nonconceptualism)? Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):316-337.
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