Meaning is Normative: A Response to Hattiangadi [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 27 (1):55-71 (2012)
Abstract
Against a broad consensus within contemporary analytic philosophy, Hattiangadi (Mind and Language 21(2):220–240, 2006 , 2007 ) has recently argued that linguistic meaning is not normative, at least not in the sense of being prescriptive. She maintains, more specifically, that standard claims to the effect that meaning is normative are usually ambiguous between two readings: one, which she calls Prescriptivity , and another, which she calls Correctness . According to Hattiangadi, though meaning is normative in the uncontroversial sense specified in the principle Correctness , it is not normative in the sense specified by Prescriptivity . In this paper, I instead show that meaning is normative in the sense of being prescriptive. My argument for this claim takes the form of a classical disjunctive syllogism. I argue that either Correctness implies (because it presupposes) Prescriptivity , or linguistically meaningful items are ‘intrinsically intentional.’ But linguistically meaningful items are not intrinsically intentional, and thus Correctness implies (because it presupposes) Prescriptivity
Keywords Philosophy of language  Wittgenstein  Kripke  Hattiangadi  Semantic normativity  Content skepticism  Intentionality
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Ralph Wedgwood (2009). The Normativity of the Intentional. In Ansgar Beckermann & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
Anandi Hattiangadi (2006). Is Meaning Normative? Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.
Aude Bandini (2011). Meaning and the Emergence of Normativity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):415-431.
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